


TOP SECRET

25X1



21 February 1966

25X1



Copy No. C 153



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY

DEPT OF STATE review(s) completed.

25X1



GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING
AND DECLASSIFICATION

TOP SECRET

25X1


Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008800110001-2

Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008800110001-2

21 February 1966


CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS



25X1

3. Indonesia: Sukarno in bold countermove against army. (Page 4)
4. Dominican Republic: Further negotiations to replace two military chiefs. (Page 5)



25X1

6. USSR: Five-year economic plan seems largely a projection of recent trends. (Page 8)



25X1

Next 5 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Indonesia: [President Sukarno appears to be attempting his boldest countermove against the army thus far.]

[redacted] on 18 February Sukarno demanded the resignations of Defense Minister Nasution and of the navy and police chiefs--who have supported the army in its anti-Communist campaign. Sukarno also plans to abolish General Nasution's other post, that of chief of staff of the armed forces.]

25X1

25X1

[Nasution went to Bandung, West Java, this weekend to avoid possible arrest. Four army battalions from the West Java command are reported to be moving to the Djakarta area.]

25X1

[*According to an Indonesian press release this morning, Sukarno plans to announce some cabinet changes later today. These could involve the removal of the three military officials. Officers whom Sukarno has considered for these positions are with him in Bogor.]

[In view of army resistance, it seems unlikely that Sukarno will press changes in the three posts at this time. He may, however, extract concessions that will facilitate his continuing effort to erode the army's political strength and resolve.]

25X1

Dominican Republic: Intense negotiations are under way to replace the last two military chiefs who took a major part in last spring's fighting.

President Garcia Godoy has informed the Organization of American States Committee of a plan calling for generals Martinez Arana and de los Santos to step down as army and air force chiefs. The two generals would retain their present ranks and serve jointly with the service chiefs on an advisory general staff board to be established. Garcia Godoy claims this plan was unanimously approved at a lengthy meeting which he held on 18 February with all the military leaders except Martinez and de los Santos, who sent their deputies.

Should the two recalcitrant generals agree, Garcia Godoy has told Ambassador Bunker that he is prepared to announce that no further changes will be made in the armed forces' command structure.

It is unlikely that such an agreement would be well received by those leftist forces which led last week's general strike. The strike and disorders may resume when the proposal becomes public knowledge. The leftists, who have consistently demanded that the generals leave the country, would probably consider their appointment to positions in the National Palace as a betrayal. In a speech on 16 February Garcia Godoy promised to demand immediate "compliance with the 6 January decrees" which ordered both generals to overseas assignments:

It now appears that there will be at least three presidential candidates in the elections scheduled for 1 June. Former president Rafael Bonnelly announced his candidacy in behalf of a "third force" on 19 February. Joaquin Balaguer publicly became the Reformist Party's candidate last summer, and Juan Bosch is expected to be the Dominican Revolutionary Party candidate.

(continued)

21 Feb 66

5

25X1

Bonnelly's "third force" will probably attempt to picture itself as filling the vacuum in a polarized political setting, but it is expected that the conservative Bonnely would run a poor third to Bosch and Balaguer and primarily take votes from Balaguer.

25X1

25X1

21 Feb 66

6

25X1

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

USSR: The official TASS summary of the 1966-70 Soviet economic plan approved by the party plenum on 19 February is generally a realistic projection of trends of the recent past, although it includes factors that make its complete accomplishment doubtful.

The summary, which presumably puts the plan in its most favorable light, sheds little new light on whether the hard decisions have been made on how to split the USSR's limited resources during the coming five years among the principal claimants: industry, agriculture, defense, and the consumer. The plan is highlighted by an increase in the national income of about 40 percent. This is to be achieved largely by a rise of some 50 percent in industrial output and an apparent growth in agricultural production of 25 percent compared with 1961-65.

Within industry, the gap between the production of capital and consumer goods is expected to narrow, but heavy industry is still favored for the rest of the 1960s. Although data on selected industrial items show planned increases of considerable magnitude, these increases appear attainable given the planned growth in investment and labor productivity. In all cases the targets are reduced from the 1970 goals included in the 20-year program approved on 1961.

The apparent 25-percent rise planned for agriculture goes far beyond the ten-percent rise claimed to have been achieved during 1961-65. This also holds for the planned 30-percent increase in grain production. Soviet statistics on grain production, which US intelligence considers to have been inflated since 1958, show only a nine-percent rise during 1961-65.

The USSR apparently is counting heavily on the incentives contained in Brezhnev's agricultural program to reach its 1970 goals for farm products. Increased

(continued)

21 Feb 66

8

25X1

yields are to be the major factor in this growth, along with a huge planned increase of 40 to 45 percent in agricultural labor productivity. A monthly guaranteed wage for collective farm workers is to be a primary means for achieving this rise.

Large increases are planned in the production of consumer durables, including a four-fold rise in the output of automobiles, but effective demand for many of these items probably will not be met during the plan period. Even if the automobile target is met, production in 1970 would still total only about 800,000 units, about ten percent of US output last year. The major emphasis in consumer welfare will be to narrow the gap between the living standards of the rural and urban population.

Emphasis on consumer durables suggests that defense expenditures will not grow rapidly. The summary simply notes that "the five-year plan is to ensure the further growth of the Soviet Union's defense capacity." However, as in all past plans, the 1966-70 plan as announced does not give any clear indication of trends in defense spending.

25X1

25X1

21 Feb 66

9

25X1

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Administrator

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET